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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Christopher A. Pentico appeals from the district court's appellate decision 
affirming the magistrate's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
The facts underlying Pentico's conviction for trespass are as follows: 
On March 25, 2008, an officer stopped Pentico on state property, in 
the vicinity of the Capitol annex, and informed Pentico that he was 
no longer authorized to be at the Capitol Annex, the third and fourth 
floors of the Borah Building, and the department of education. On 
April 2, 2008, Pentico visited the Governor's office on the third floor 
of the Borah Building. After Pentico left the Borah Building, he was 
cited for trespass .... 
State v. Pentico, 151 Idaho 906, 909, 265 P.3d 519, 522 (Ct. App. 2011). The 
Court of Appeals rejected several constitutional challenges, holding that some 
were not preserved and not fundamental error. !st at 912-14, 265 P.3d at 525-
27. The Court of Appeals ultimately affirmed Pentico's conviction, concluding 
that Pentico's actions when he entered the reception area of the Governor's 
office on April 6 were not constitutionally protected. !st at 916, 265 P.3d at 529. 
Pentico filed a petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp. 5-17.) One of the 
claims was that trial counsel was ineffective for not claiming that the March 25 
exclusion from certain government property violated Pentico's rights. (R., pp. 10-
16.) The state moved for summary dismissal of the petition. (R., pp. 22-32.) 
Pentico responded. (R., pp. 41-46.) The magistrate granted the state's motion 
and dismissed the petition. (R., pp. 98-99.) Pentico timely appealed to the 
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district court (R., pp. 101-02), which affirmed (R., pp. 153-66). Pentico filed a 
timely notice of appeal. {R., pp. 189-90.) 
2 
ISSUE 
Pentico states the issue on appeal as: 
I. Did the District Court err when it upheld the Trial Court's 
grant of summary dismissal? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 8.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Pentico submitted no evidence suggesting that the content of his speech 
was the basis for his March 25 exclusion from certain government property. 
Because he presented no evidence supporting a claim that the March 25 
exclusion violated his rights, did he fail to present evidence supporting his claim 
that counsel was ineffective for not claiming that his rights were violated by the 




Pentico Has Failed To Show Error In The Summary Dismissal Of His Petition 
Because He Presented No Evidence Of Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel 
Introduction 
On appeal in the underlying criminal case, the Idaho Court of Appeals 
concluded that the issue of whether Pentico was constitutionally excluded on 
March 25 from coming into the area of the Governor's office thereafter was not 
preserved and was not fundamental error. Pentico, 151 Idaho at 909-15, 265 
P.3d at 522-28. The Court of Appeals noted that, even though evidence of 
Pentico's behavior had been excluded at trial and in relation to the constitutional 
claims, evidence at sentencing suggesting Pentico had been "involved in causing 
a disturbance at the department of education and that he had recently become 
persistent in contacting members of the Governor's staff regarding his issue with 
the department of education." 1st at 909 n.1, 265 P.3d at 522, n. 1. 
In his petition Pentico alleged his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
claim his March 25 exclusion violated his constitutional rights. (R., pp. 10-16.) 
After the state moved for summary dismissal he filed an affidavit asserting that 
on March 25 he wished to contact Representative Barrett about obtaining an 
Attorney General's opinion on perceived religious discrimination at BSU but was 
instead contacted by a state trooper and told to not come on certain state 
property including the Governor's offices; facts he had relayed to his attorney. 
(R., pp. 48-50.) Pentico also filed an affidavit from his attorney indicating he 
never considered challenging the government's action on March 25 as being 
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unconstitutional, focusing instead on the actions of April 2 that constituted the 
crime. (R., pp. 79-81.) 
The magistrate dismissed the ineffective assistance of counsel claim on 
the basis that there was no material issue of fact. (R., p. 99.) On appeal the 
district court affirmed, concluding the magistrate had correctly determined that 
Pentico had failed to present sufficient evidence to indicate he would have 
prevailed on a claim that the government violated Pentico's rights on March 25 
by excluding him from coming to the Governor's office. (R., pp. 160-65.) 
On appeal Pentico argues that the "unrebutted facts" show that he would 
have prevailed on a claim that the government's actions on March 25 violated his 
rights, and therefore his counsel's performance was deficient and he was 
prejudiced. (Appellant's brief, pp. 9-28.) Application of the correct legal 
standards shows Pentico failed to present evidence establishing a prima facie 
claim that his counsel was ineffective for not raising a challenge to the 
government's actions on March 25. 
B. Standard Of Review 
In reviewing the summary dismissal of a post-conviction application, the 
appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact 
exists which, if resolved in petitioner's favor, would require relief to be granted. 
Nellsch v. State, 122 Idaho 426, 434, 835 P.2d 661, 669 (Ct. App. 1992). The 
court freely reviews the district court's application of the law. 1st at 434, 835 P.2d 
at 669. However, the court is not required to accept either the applicant's mere 
conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's 
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conclusions of law. Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 
(2001). 
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate 
appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's 
decision to determine whether it correctly decided the issues presented to it on 
appeal." Barley v. Smith, 149 Idaho 171, 176, 233 P.3d 102, 107 (2010); see 
also Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008). 
C. The Lower Courts Properly Concluded Pentico Had Failed To Establish A 
Prima Facie Claim Of Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel 
"To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must 
present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the 
claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace, 
140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 
583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). The elements of a claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel are: 1) that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness, and 2) that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). 
"As a general matter, the First Amendment means that government has no 
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, 
or its content." United States v. Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. 2537, 2543 (2012) (internal 
quotation and brackets omitted). Reasonable time, place and manner 
restrictions are allowed, but only if "justified without reference to the content of 
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the regulated speech." RAV. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992) 
(internal quotation omitted). Idaho's trespass statute is "capable of constitutional 
application to government-owned nonpublic forums, such as government office 
buildings or portions of college campuses that, unlike traditional public forums 
such as a public street, public park or sidewalk, or the steps of the state Capitol 
building, are not open to the public for expressive activities." State v. Korsen, 
138 Idaho 706, 715, 69 P .3d 126, 135 (2003) ( citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry 
Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983)), abrogated on other grounds 
Evans v. Michigan, 133 S.Ct. 1069 (2013). 
To show that his constitutional rights were violated on March 25, Pentico's 
trial counsel would have had to prove that the exclusion from the Governor's 
offices that day was based on the content of Pentico's speech, as opposed to a 
content neutral decision or one based on non-communicative conduct, volume, 
or active disruption of the activities of others. See State v. Poe, 139 Idaho 885, 
895-96, 88 P.3d 704, 714-15 (2004) (upholding constitutionality of disturbing the 
peace statute insofar as it prohibits disturbing the peace by loud noise or conduct 
or unprotected speech such as "fighting words"); State v. Suiter, 138 Idaho 13, 
56 P.3d 775 (2002) (allowing conviction for disturbing the peace for yelling at 
police officer in police station only if content of speech is not considered). If 
counsel was able to establish that the restriction was content-based, the 
restriction would have been "presumed invalid" and the State would have had the 
burden of showing constitutionality. Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. at 2543-44 (citing 
Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 660 (2004)). 
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The evidence presented by Pentico does not state a viable claim that his 
First Amendment rights were violated. Specifically, there is no evidence that the 
March 25 instruction that Pentico was not to come to the Governor's office area 
was based in any way on the content of protected speech. Pentico alleges that 
the officer told him that he was being asked to not be on certain State property, 
including the Governor's office, because his "behavior was making people 
nervous and uncomfortable." (R., p. 49.) He further alleges the Capitol annex 
was "the only government office [he] visited" on March 25, 2008. (Id.) He does 
not deny that he was "involved in causing a disturbance at the department of 
education and that he had recently become persistent in contacting members of 
the Governor's staff regarding his issue with the department of education." 
Pentico, 151 Idaho at 909 n.1, 265 P.3d at 522, n. 1. 
This evidence, and the other evidence Pentico submitted (R., pp. 48-97), 
does not establish any basis for a motion claiming that excluding Pentico from 
visits to the Governor's office constituted a First Amendment violation. There is 
no evidence that the State excluded Pentico for the content of any 
constitutionally protected speech. Indeed, he fails to articulate that any speech 
or other expression was at all involved. Because he failed to establish any claim 
that his right to free speech was implicated, he failed to make a prima facie 
showing that his attorney's performance was deficient or prejudicial. 
Pentico asserts that the "trespass statute as applied under the 
circumstances of this case is unconstitutionally overbroad." (Appellant's brief, p. 
13; see also p. 14 ("The overbreadth doctrine is a means of challenging the 
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constitutionality of a statute on its face or as applied to particular conduct.").) 
Based on this erroneous legal assertion, he argues that his exclusion from 
certain State property for a year was overly broad, and therefore his trial counsel 
could have claimed a constitutional violation even though Pentico was not 
exercising any constitutional rights on April 6, the time of the trespass for which 
he was actually convicted. 1 (Appellant's brief, pp. 13-28.2) Because the 
argument is based on an erroneous legal assertion, it fails. 
"The traditional rule is that a person to whom a statute may constitutionally 
be applied may not challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably 
be applied unconstitutionally to others in situations not before the court." Los 
Angeles Police Dept. v. United Reporting Pub. Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 38 (1999) 
(internal quotes omitted). Overbreadth challenges are "discouraged" because 
they "call for relaxing familiar requirements of standing, to allow a determination 
that the law would be unconstitutionally applied to different parties and different 
circumstances from those at hand." Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609 
(2004). Because an "overbreadth" challenge is by definition a claim that "the law 
1 To the extent Pentico is claiming he was exercising a constitutional right on April 
6, such an argument is barred by the appellate decision in the criminal case. 
Pentico, 151 Idaho at_, 265 P.3d at 527-28. 
2 Pentico also argues that because he had no legal mechanism to challenge the 
scope or enforceability of the exclusion he was denied due process. (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 18-21.) That trial counsel was ineffective for failing to claim a 
procedural due process violation was not raised below. Moreover, the State 
afforded Pentico a criminal trial, the most process anyone is due. Finally, the 
State acknowledges that it may not punish Pentico if he was in fact exercising a 
First Amendment right regardless of the process afforded. For these reasons 
this argument is irrelevant. 
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would be unconstitutionally applied to different parties and different 
circumstances from those at hand," there is by definition no such thing as an 
"overbreadth as applied" challenge. 
Moreover, overbreadth is a facial challenge to the validity of a statute. 
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472-73 (2010). "The first step in 
overbreadth analysis is to construe the challenged statute; it is impossible to 
determine whether a statute reaches too far without first knowing what the statute 
covers." United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 293 (2008). The Idaho 
Supreme Court has already upheld the trespassing statute against an 
overbreadth challenge. Korsen, 138 Idaho at 713-16, 69 P.3d at 133-36. 
Pentico's claim that the statute may have been unconstitutionally applied to him 
under circumstances other than those on April 6 (for which he was charged and 
convicted) would necessarily have been rejected because the statute is not 
overbroad. 
Finally, the Supreme Court of the United States has stated that banning a 
person's reentry onto government property, even if the reentry is for the specific 
purpose of exercising the right to free speech, does not violate the First 
Amendment as long as the grounds for banning the person from the property in 
the first place was not based on that person's exercise of a right. Virginia v. 
Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 123 (2003) ("punishment of a person who has (pursuant to 
a lawful regulation) been banned from a public park after vandalizing it, and who 
ignores the ban in order to take part in a political demonstration" does not 
"implicate[] the First Amendment"). Pentico's argument that his exclusion could 
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theoretically have curtailed his access to a public forum or other exercise of his 
right to free speech does not even implicate the First Amendment. 
Pentico's evidence does not support a prima facie claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel for not filing a motion claiming that excluding Pentico from 
coming to the area of the Governor's office on March 25 violated Pentico's First 
Amendment rights. Although excluding Pentico from the Governor's office area 
because of the content of his speech would have been a violation of his 
constitutional rights, Pentico presented no evidence indicating such was the 
case. Likewise, Pentico's argument on appeal that his counsel should have 
claimed that the exclusion may have violated Pentico's rights under 
circumstances other than those for which he was prosecuted has no basis in the 
law. Pentico has therefore failed to show any error in the summary dismissal of 
his petition. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's 
opinion affirming the magistrate's summary dismissal of Pentico's petition for 
post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 12th day of January, 2015. 
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